Tony Blair appraised
Tony Blair UK Prime Minister from 1997 - 2007 ‘A Journey to the Iraq Inquiry’
"Anyone who has a continuous smile on his face conceals a toughness that is almost frightening'" Greta Garbo
Sir John Chilcot, chairman of Iraq Inquiry, public statement 6/07/ 2016 extracts:
We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.
The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.
We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory….
However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear. Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the Security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision
In the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s WMD. He said that, at some point in the future, that threat would become a reality
The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair stated that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was "a real and present danger to Britain and its national security" – and that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.
Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.
It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.
The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq Survey Group in October 2004 were significant. But they did not support pre-invasion statements by the UK Government, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities, which Mr Blair and Mr Straw had described as "vast stocks" and an urgent and growing threat.
Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance.
We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.
More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict in Iraq. Many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish for many families, including those who are here today.
The invasion and subsequent instability in Iraq had, by July 2009, also resulted in the deaths of at least one hundred and fifty thousand Iraqis – and probably many more – most of them civilians. More than a million people were displaced. The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.
The security situation in both Baghdad and the South East began to deteriorate soon after the invasion.
The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.
We have sought to set out the Government’s actions on Iraq fully and impartially. The evidence is there for all to see. It is an account of an intervention which went badly wrong, with consequences to this day.
The Inquiry Report is the Committee’s unanimous view.
Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point. But in March 2003:
There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.
The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time.
The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.
Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.
(To see the full introductorty statement or the full Iraq Enquiry go to the Iraq Enquiry website)
"Anyone who has a continuous smile on his face conceals a toughness that is almost frightening'" Greta Garbo
Sir John Chilcot, chairman of Iraq Inquiry, public statement 6/07/ 2016 extracts:
We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.
The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.
We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory….
However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear. Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the Security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision
In the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s WMD. He said that, at some point in the future, that threat would become a reality
The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair stated that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was "a real and present danger to Britain and its national security" – and that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.
Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.
It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.
The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq Survey Group in October 2004 were significant. But they did not support pre-invasion statements by the UK Government, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities, which Mr Blair and Mr Straw had described as "vast stocks" and an urgent and growing threat.
Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance.
We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.
More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict in Iraq. Many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish for many families, including those who are here today.
The invasion and subsequent instability in Iraq had, by July 2009, also resulted in the deaths of at least one hundred and fifty thousand Iraqis – and probably many more – most of them civilians. More than a million people were displaced. The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.
The security situation in both Baghdad and the South East began to deteriorate soon after the invasion.
The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.
We have sought to set out the Government’s actions on Iraq fully and impartially. The evidence is there for all to see. It is an account of an intervention which went badly wrong, with consequences to this day.
The Inquiry Report is the Committee’s unanimous view.
Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point. But in March 2003:
There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.
The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time.
The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.
Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.
(To see the full introductorty statement or the full Iraq Enquiry go to the Iraq Enquiry website)
